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Nash Equilibrium in Games with Quasi-Monotonic Best-Responses, Journal of Economic Theory, 172, 220-246 (2017). (Co-author: Rabah Amir)
Implementation under Ambiguity, Games and Economic Behavior, 101 (2017): 20-33. (Co-authors: Nicholas Yannelis and Zhiwei Liu).
Ambiguous implementation: the partition model, Economic Theory, 63(1), 233-261 (2017). (Co-authors: Nicholas Yannelis and Zhiwei Liu).
Transition to Centralized Unit Commitment: An Econometric Analysis of Colombia’s Experience, The Energy Journal, 37(3), 271-291, 2016. (Co-authors: Alvaro Riascos, Miguel Bernal, Shmuel Oren)
“Free entry versus socially optimal entry,” Journal of Economic Theory, 154, 112-125, 2014. (Co-authors: Rabah Amir and Leonidas Koutsougeras)
Parametric Representation of Preferences, Journal of Economic Theory, 150, 642-647. (Co-author: Nabil Al-Najjar)
Paying for the Smart Grid, Energy Economics, 40 (supplement 1), S74-S84, 2013. (Co-author: Joisa Dutra)
“Ambiguity aversion and Trade”, Economic Theory, 48, 243-273, 2011. (Co-author: A. Chateauneuf)
Core and Equilibria under ambiguity, Economic Theory, 48, 519-548, 2011. (Co-authors: M. Pesce and N. Yannelis).
“Equilibrium Existence and Approximation of Regular Discontinuous Games”, Economic Theory, 48, 67-85, 2011.
“Testing Affiliation in Private-Values Models of First-Price Auctions Using Grid Distributions,” Annals of Applied Statistics, vol. 4 (4), 2073—2098, 2010. (Co-author: Harry Paarsch.)
“Pure Strategy Equilibria of Single and Double-Auctions with Interdependent Values”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 65, 1, 25-48, January 2009. (Co-author: A. Araujo.)
“Non-monotonicities and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule”, Economic Theory vol. 35, 4, June 2008, 407-440. (Co-authors: A. Araujo and H. Moreira.)
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